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conservative and in general less inclined to pay for expenditures in the public sector as a 
whole. 
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 1 Introduction
The demographic ageing process in most industrialized countries will reverse the demographic
pyramid within the next decades. While the fraction of school age people will decrease, the
fraction of people over the retirement age will almost double within the next forty years. Research
in some countries has analyzed the eects these demographic changes will have on educational
spending. While the reduction in the number of school age children alone will most probably not
free as many resources as expected (see e.g. Grob and Wolter 2007), some papers show that it is
the rising share of elderly that will have a negative impact on educational spending. The existing
body of empirical research has so far - with one exception (see Brunner and Balsdon 2004) -
analyzed the correlation between the shares of elderly and the educational spending at the local,
state-wide or national level. The results show in most cases a negative correlation between the
two but also notable exceptions, especially on the local levels of government. Dierences in the
political systems and the nancing mechanisms of public spending on education of the analyzed
cases and countries may explain some of the divergence in the results. In any case, the data used
in these papers does not allow to establish a direct proof that the elderly are less inclined than
younger people to spend money on education or that the elderly dier in their preferences for
the use of public money. This paper tries to ll some of this gap by using a data-set that has
been specically collected for the purpose of this analysis. In May 2007 a representative sample
of over 2000 Swiss nationals (with voting rights) has been surveyed in order to analyze whether
there are really age-dependent dierences in the willingness to spend money on education and the
preferences for the spending of public resources.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 devotes some space to the theoretical discussion
about age and the preferences for educational spending and lists the most recent empirical liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the hypotheses tested and the methodology applied in this paper. The
forth section presents the data and provides some descriptive statistics. The empirical results are
shown in section 5 and the conclusions drawn in regards to education policy are given in the nal
section.
12 Are the elderly less willing to spend on education?
The fraction of elderly people is increasing in relation to young people or children in school age
and there are reasons to expect that this trend will continue in the future. This demographic shift
will have consequences for the way public funds are distributed among dierent areas. Assuming
that each individual in a democratic process is likely to push for his own interest, and that the
public budget is limited, one might expect from the ageing median voter a decreasing support for
policies which do not directly benet the elderly. In the median voter theorem the government
provides the amount of goods chosen by the median voter (see Downs, 1957). To the extent that
the aged median voter might push for an allocation of funds that benets the elderly, many studies
have focused on the eects this might have on the nance of public services targeted to families
or children such as education.
If we concentrate on people that are near or already over the retirement age, the age group that
will increase the most over the next decades, it is safe to assume that they will not get any direct
prot from continuing or starting a formal education. Moreover, most of them have children who
already left the formal education system. Thus, following strictly their personal interest, older
people most probably have a smaller incentive to spend tax money on education. At the same
time, public resources are scarce and limited and older people might prefer to spend public money
in favor of policies that benet them, like health or social security, thereby increasing the pressure
on educational spending without directly voting against it.
Still there are some arguments discussed in the literature (see also Grob and Wolter 2007, p.
280/81) why the elderly might choose to continue supporting education in the same way as other
age groups.
1. Positive intergenerational externalities. This might produce an eect whereby the older
population has a stake in a well-educated population whose higher productivity is essential
in nancing transfer benets (old age pension, healthcare system, etc.), the greatest bene-
ciaries of which are the elderly. This primary argument is based on the rationale that even
a purely egoistical voter will not tend to lower spending on education because that would
undermine his or her own interests. This line of argument assumes that the median voter
2both understands this relationship and that his actions are not solely based on thoughts of
short-term gain1. However, the latter is a strong argument against this view considering
that older voters are more likely to be interested in the short-term rather than the long-term
consequences of their behavior, given their shorter life expectancy.
2. If there were a kind of intergenerational altruism that more or less ensures that older people
feel bound by a generational contract (see e.g. Poterba 1996), the elderly would enable
the young generation to enjoy the same funding that was aorded to themselves during
their own youth 2. One could furthermore assume that the older generation feels the more
bound by the generational contract the more they themselves rely on funds with which
younger generations are nancing public goods that are more often consumed by the older
generation3.
3. U.S. studies in particular indicate a positive correlation between the quality of schooling and
housing prices4. On the basis of this frequently observed relationship, it might be assumed
that older citizens (many of whom are property owners) would try to maintain the value
of their property by supporting spending on education. This argument is based on the
circumstance that today's property market is dominated by newcomers to an area, who are
likely to have school age children and therefore be willing to pay higher property prices in
order to secure a higher-quality education for their ospring. It is uncertain whether this
1Konrad (1995) and Kemnitz (1999, 2000) put forward this argument, for example.
2Berkman and Plutzer (2004) show that the emotional "bond between generations" can only be found for
longstanding older residents, whereas elderly newcomers in a district lower spending on education. The results
seem to indicate that social capital in the form of "bonding" is an asset for educational expenditures.
3Borge and Rattso (2007) investigate the relationship between the fraction of population in a certain age and
spending in three sectors: child care, education and care for the elderly. They nd, using Danish panel data, that
a larger proportion of older people decreases spending in child care and primary and lower secondary education,
while the share of younger people does not threaten services for the elderly. According to this empirical evidence
it looks as if the intergenerational solidarity does not go always both ways.
4Harris et al. (2001) use this argument to explain their empirical results, which identied a negative impact
of the number of senior citizens on educational spending at State-level but no negative impact on local (County)
educational spending. Declining spending at local level would have more of a negative impact on property prices than
spending at State-level. Harris et al. (2001) use this argument to try and reconcile the dierent results of Poterba
(1998) and Ladd and Murray (2001). Capitalization eects have been argued for and shown also by Brueckner and
Joo (1991), Brunner and Baldson (2004) and Hilber and Mayer (2004). The capitalization argument also highlights
the importance of the nancing and decision making mechanisms. The more governments are centralized, the less
age dependent regional or even local dierences in the level of spending on education is possible. This also means
that the level of aggregation of data has to concur with the degree of centralization of political decision making and
that empirical results can not be transferred easily from one political system to another.
3argument will continue to apply in the future when, due to demographic ageing, more and
more potential homebuyers will not have school-age children and will therefore not take the
quality of the local schools into consideration when deciding where to buy a new home.
4. As a variant of the above mentioned arguments one could also imagine that the number
of older people in a community has no impact on the per-pupil funding but leads to a
geographical sorting of people according to their age and respective preferences. In a Tiebout
(1956) framework, people would sort into the community that best ts their preferences.
According to this line of argument elderly people might choose to live in communities with
fewer school age children and with less taxes spent on education. If this sorting takes place,
one would not detect a correlation between the shares of elderly in a certain geographical area
and the per-pupil spending on education5. However, if one would measure the correlation
between the shares of elderly and the per-capita spending on education, one would nd a
negative relationship.
Apart from age there are other factors which might aect the willingness or the ability to
pay for education. These factors have to be taken into account as control variables when trying
to assess the impact of age in order to avoid biased results. The composition of the population
according to race or nationality (see e.g. Alesina et al. 1999 or Robinson 2006) could inuence
the willingness of the majority of voters to spend money on education. Exogenous shocks, like
a substantial rise in unemployment, could increase the competition for public funds and thereby
negatively aect the educational budgets (see Baum and Seitz 2003). Last but not least the levels
of funding per pupil also depend on the specic needs of the pupils. Pupils with special needs ask
for more funding and these pupils are not evenly spread over school districts6.
Looking at the predictions derived from the more theoretical literature (see e.g. Gradstein
and Kaganovich 2004), one cannot safely conclude that there has to be a negative impact of the
5Robinson (2007) using school district and Census data from the U.S. nds that elderly individuals with dierent
preferences have sorted into dierent urbanicity types. He only nds a negative impact of the shares of elderly on
the funding levels per pupil in suburban districts and not in urban or rural districts.
6Grob and Wolter (2007) nd that in Swiss Cantons with higher shares of immigrants - most of whom do
not speak any of the national languages and come from low socio-economic backgrounds - the levels of per pupil
spending on education are higher. If at the same time the elder Swiss nationals sort into Cantons with low shares
of immigrants, not controlling for the share of immigrants in a Canton or school district would bias the coecients
for the share of elderly people.
4share of elderly on educational expenditures. Looking at the empirical literature, the picture gets
somewhat clearer but the ndings are not unanimous. First, the literature on the age eects on
educational spending is so far restricted to only a small number of countries (the U.S., Denmark,
Germany and Switzerland). Secondly, the evidence coming from this literature is somewhat
mixed, with a small majority of papers suggesting a negative impact of the share of elderly on
educational expenditures. In the U.S., earlier literature suggesting a negative relationship by
South (1991), Button (1992) or Hoyt and Toma (1993) had been corroborated by the ndings of
Poterba (1996, 1997 and 1998), Fernandez and Rogerson (2001), Harris et al. (2001), Brunner and
Balsdon (2004) and to a certain extent also Ladd and Murray (2001), while Berkman and Plutzer
(2004), Plutzer and Berkman (2005)7 and Robinson (2007) found that in certain cases the older
cohorts could even be more supportive of education expenditures. In Denmark (Borge and Rattso,
2007) and Switzerland (Grob and Wolter, 2007), negative relationships were found, whereas in
Germany, Kempkes and Seitz (2005) did not nd a correlation at all between the age composition
of the population and education expenditures of West German states. However, Oberndorfer and
Steiner (2006)8, using education expenditures on higher education, found a negative eect of the
share of the population over 55 on educational spending.
3 Hypotheses and survey questionnaire
The goal of this paper is to test the willingness to spend money on education and the age-related
dierences in preferences for public spending as directly as possible. The analysis implements an
approach already used by Brunner and Balsdon (2004), in which they asked a sample of potential
voters in California to express their opinion on one actual and one ctitious initiative concerning
educational expenditures. The same approach makes sense in the context of Switzerland with its
highly developed system of direct democracy, where voters are frequently asked to express their
views on similar questions at the polls9.
7Plutzer and Berkman (2005) argue that the ndings in surveys according to which the older generation is less
willing to spend money on education confuse age and cohort eects. In their analysis younger generations have
become more supportive of education expenditures as they reach their 60s and 70s.
8A German version was published in the journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 8 (2), pp.165-183
9Direct democracy allows Swiss citizens to inuence policy making at almost every stage of decision making
through the right to propose new laws or the possibility to hinder new legislation by referendum.
5Three specic questions had been developed and tested in a pre-test to analyze the willingness
to spend money on education and the preferences for the use of public money:
1. The rst question asked the respondents: "Assume that in your Canton of residence10 an
initiative to increase the expenditures on primary and lower secondary school by 10% is
launched. If the vote were today, would you support the initiative, yes or no?"11
2. The second question of interest is: "Assume your Canton of residence presents a series of
measures oriented to improve the education quality. How many extra francs in taxes per
year would you be willing to spend in order to implement these measures?" There were four
possible answers: zero, 1-100, 101-500 and more than 500 Swiss Francs (CHF)12.
Both questions tend to answer the same, i.e., how likely people are to support more spending
on schools. However, there are some subtle dierences between them. In the rst question the
fact that in order to increase school spending taxes will have to be raised or budgets reallocated is
not mentioned. Thus, it is left open who is ultimately going to pay for the increase in educational
expenditures. This can lead people to answer in a dierent way, than if they are asked directly
about having to pay extra taxes. As framing eects (see e.g. B utler and Mar echal 2007) also
inuence voting behavior in a decisive way, we thought it worthwhile to analyze two dierent
formulations of a seemingly identical question and compare the results.
3. To analyze the question whether age inuences the respondents' preferences for specic
sectors of public activity, we asked: "Which public expenditures should have priority in the
future? Order the following sectors assigning numbers 1 to 5 in the order of your preferences.
Assign each number only once." The sectors chosen for comparison were: health, police and
justice, education, public transport and social security. The hypothesis is that compared to
10The Canton was used as the political and geographical area because such measures are voted in most Cantons
at the cantonal level. School districts have various degrees of freedom to implement measures and to run schools
but in most Cantons they cannot decide on the overall amount of resources devoted to education. Even if in most
Cantons school districts or communities raise the taxes to pay for education, the level of funding and spending is
decided on cantonal level in order to assure equity in the provision of education.
11The 10% increase in the question can be regarded as a realistic gure in the Swiss context. As a matter of
comparison, one can look at the plan of the federal government for the expenditures on education, science and
technology for the period 2008-2011. The government had initially proposed a growth rate of 4.5% for the next
four year period but the main political parties in the parliament asked for growth rates between 6 and 10%.
121 Swiss Franc (CHF) corresponds roughly to 0.8 USD or 0.6 Euro.
6sectors of public activity where specic age groups most probably do not exhibit dierent
patterns of preferences (justice and public transport), elderly people would prefer public
spending on health and social security over education more often than younger age groups.
Two questions had then been developed to control for alternative explanations of dierences
in the willingness to spend public money on education, which could also be age related.
First, elderly people might be against higher public expenditures in general and not only
particularly against education expenditures. If this were the case, higher shares of elderly in a
district would lead to lower per pupil spending but not because the older cohorts are specically
against spending on education but because they press for lower public spending in general. To
avoid the confusing eects that might arise from this we will control for this in the analysis.
Hence, individuals were asked about their willingness to pay taxes in general. The exact
question was "Assume you have to vote in an initiative that proposes a reduction of taxes by
10%, nanced by a general reduction in public expenditures by 10%. If the vote were today,
would you support the initiative, yes or no?"13
Secondly, the partisan theory (Hibbs 1977) postulates that parties and ideologies play a role
in political decision making, and therefore in determining education expenditures as well. The
assumption is that more left-oriented individuals are more likely to encourage public education
expenditures, the opposite being true for their right-oriented counterparts14. Thus we will control
for political ideology as old and young people might dier in their political preferences and it
might be the political preferences that matter and not age. If this were the case, not controlling
for the political orientation of the people living in a district could lead to wrongly interprete the
eect of political ideology as an age eect.
In the aforementioned empirical studies, the political orientation of the population was some-
times measured by the political composition of the government or the parliament but these vari-
ables are - depending on the political system - in many cases only crude measures or even mis-
13Initiatives with similar postulates had been voted in several Swiss Cantons in the past years. Therefore the
question can be regarded as a realistic one in the Swiss political context.
14Oberndorfer and Steiner (2006) found in Germany that against their expectations it were the German states
with a conservative or coalition government including the conservative party that showed the highest expenditures
in higher education.
7leading. One can safely assume that if politicians sense that the median voter becomes more
conservative then even left-oriented political parties adopt a more conservative approach to many
policy questions.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To study the hypotheses presented in the previous section we commissioned the professional survey
institute "Gesellschaft f ur praktische Sozialforschung" (GfS)15 to collect data from a representative
sample of Swiss citizens. The sample contains data on 2025 Swiss citizens over the age of 25. The
data was collected in May 2007 using Computed Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). The
interviews were held in German, French or Italian depending on the language region. Apart from
individual socio-economic and family characteristics, respondents were asked to express their
opinion on a series of question concerning education and education nancing.
The main control variables, apart from age as the regressor of interest, include education,
political orientation, if the respondent has children, whether the children are still in school and
household income.
In order to control for political orientation we created three dummies: right, centre and left.
The individuals were asked to indicate their political sympathies using an 11 points scale from 0
to 10, 0 being completely left and 10 completely right. The indicator right was created assigning
1 to all people who responded 7 or higher, left was created assigning 1 to people who responded
3 or lower. The rest, 4, 5, 6, were classied as centre (the distribution of the variable can be seen
in Appendix 1).
In order to control for education we created three dummy variables based on the highest level
of education attained and following standard degree classication. The three dummies are primary
education which includes people with completed primary school or lower secondary school. The
dummy secondary education includes all people with completed grammar school or a vocational
training on upper secondary level. Finally tertiary education includes all people with a university,
university of applied science or higher vocational training degree.
15The GfS institute is one of the leading institutes in Switzerland carrying out opinion polls. It has a long
tradition in political analyses and representative polls for elections and votes.
8Respondents were also asked about their net monthly household income. Each respondent
could choose among ve income classes. For each income category we generated a dummy variable.
Missing values were imputed using the Swiss Labor Force Survey as an information source.
Table 1 provides the descriptive summary of the data. The results show that 71% of the
respondents would support a 10% increase in education expenditures. The percentage of support
for those over 60 is below the mean, whereas for the age group between 30 and 50 it is above the
mean. The dierence in support between the group of the 30-50s and the over-60s is statistically
signicant.
Regarding the question about the willingness to pay more taxes for measures designed to
improve the quality of education, the majority of people would be willing to spend either zero
or between 0 and 100 extra francs per year. Results suggest that respondents over 50 are more
likely to refuse to pay any extra taxes for education and that they are less likely to accept paying
between 1 and 100 extra francs than people in 25-50 age-group. When we look at the small group
(6%) of people who would be willing to spend more than 500 CHF we do not nd a clear age
pattern.
The answers to the third question show that almost 46% of the respondents consider that
education should be the sector to prioritize in the future, followed by health. However, the
fraction of education supporters diers when looking at the ranking made by dierent age groups.
Around 50% of the respondents aged between 30 and 50 prioritize education and about 25%
prioritize health. They are the age-group with the largest support for education. The advantage
of education over health for people older than 70 is much smaller. Those older than 60 are clearly
overrepresented in the group giving the highest priority to social security. Lower support for
education is also given by people between 25 and 30. The latter also show a relatively large
support for social security. This might be due to the fact that this group is entering the labor
market and may fear unemployment or has just founded a family and is more likely to depend on
social transfers.
||- Table 1 about here ||
9The descriptive results seem to indicate that the elderly are supportive of education but less
so than the age group of the 30-50 years old. However this dierence might be due to many other
factors, like still having children in the school-going age16, political preferences17 or income class.
To control for all these eects multivariate analyses are used and the results are presented in the
next section.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Are the elderly against increasing education expenditures?
In Section 3 we postulated that senior citizens might be against incrementing education expen-
ditures because of the belief that any extra spending will not provide any direct benet to them.
We will study this hypothesis using the answers to the question on the initiative to increase
educational expenditures by 10% using the following probit model:
P(yesi = 1jagei;xi) = (0 + agei   + x0
i)
Where  is the normal cumulative distribution function, yes is an indicator variable equal to
one if the person answered yes to the question whether he/she was willing to accept an initiative
to increase school spending and zero otherwise. x includes all variables other than age that could
inuence the probability of accepting the initiative, among them political orientation, whether
the respondent has children in school age, household income, highest level of education attained
and place of residence.
Table 2 presents the results of the probit model using the data described in Section 4. Column
1 shows that age has indeed a negative inuence on the probability of supporting an increase in
education expenditures18. One more year of age decreases the probability of supporting the
increase in education spending by 0.15 percentage points (marginal eects)19. However, this
16Approximately 70% of the 40-49 years old have school age children against only 9% of the older than 70.
17Only 15% of the individuals older than 70 classied themselves on the left side of the political scale against
about 25% in the 30-60 years age-group. Furthermore: Around one third of the people over 60 would support an
initiative for a general reduction of taxes and public expenditures. The fraction of supporters is only between a
fth and a quarter for the 30-50 years old.
18We tried two alternative specications: one including age square and one including a dummy for each age
group. The results remain unchanged and we did not nd evidence supporting the non linear specications.
19Marginal eects for all coecients can be obtained from the authors on request
10negative eect disappears as soon as we control for political orientation. This means that the
age eect in Column 1 just captures the fact that older people have dierent political preferences
than younger ones and that people with a more conservative political orientation are less likely
to support the proposed initiative irrespective of age.
Not surprising is the result that people who would like to reduce public spending in general also
prefer not to increase school expenditures. The result also shows that the surveyed respondents
were consistent in their answer pattern. Moreover, individuals with primary school only are less
likely to support an increase in education spending than individuals with a tertiary degree. The
same holds for people living on the countryside or in small towns compared to urban regions,
even when controlling for the educational level of respondents. This result is consistent with the
observation that per pupil spending in urban or even "city"-cantons is signicantly higher than in
rural Cantons, even when controlling for dierences in the price- and income-levels. Homeowners
are less likely to support higher education expenditures, a result that is in contradiction with the
results found by Grob and Wolter (2007) using panel data on educational expenditures of Swiss
Cantons.
||- Table 2 about here ||
Looking at the results in Table 220 we do not nd evidence that the bigger share of elderly
in the group of those who would have voted against an increase in educational spending is due
to a genuine age eect. It is rather the result of the elderly having more conservative political
convictions, the fact that they are against higher public expenses in general and to a certain
extent their lower educational level compared to younger cohorts. In order to see if the results
change when we formulate the question in a slightly dierent way, we present the results in the
next subsection using the question which explicitly asks for the willingness to pay higher taxes
for educational purposes.
20The number of observations depends on the number of respondents who had chosen the answer category "do
not know". In order to check whether this might lead to biased results in our regressions, we also carried out "non-
response" analysis. This analysis showed, that the group of those respondents with the lowest level of education
signicantly more often choose not to respond to a question. Unfortunately, we can not correct for this potential
bias with a selection correction model as all variables that could inuence the choice to answer or not also have a
potential impact on our dependent variables.
115.2 Willingness to pay more taxes in order to improve the quality of education
In the questionnaire respondents were asked how many extra francs in taxes per year they would
be willing to pay in order to improve school quality. They could give 4 possible answers: 0 CHF
(0), 1-100 CHF (1), 101-500 CHF (2) and more than 500 CHF (3). To analyze this a multinomial
logit model of the form:
P(yi = jjagei;xi) =




exp(agei  r + x0
ir)
j = 0;:::;3
is used. The vector x includes the same variables as in subsection 5.1 and a constant, and 0
= 0 and 0 = 0 as normalization for the base category (0).
The results are presented in Table 3. Specication 1 shows that older people are less willing to
support a tax increase of between 1 and 500 CHF over no increase. However, they are indierent
between paying 0 extra Swiss francs and more than 500 CHF. Results change little when we
include the other controls. Specication 4 shows that the elderly are more likely to prefer to pay
zero extra taxes rather than to pay between 1 and 100 CHF but they are also more likely to
support an increase of more than 500 CHF in comparison to no increase at all. The probability of
being willing to spend more than 500 extra francs per year increases by 0.1 percentage point with
each year of age. This might be indicating that even though the majority of the elderly refuse to
pay more taxes to support more spending in education, a small fraction, maybe for philanthropic
or altruistic reasons, is willing to spend much more than the average person.
As expected, income plays an important role in determining how much extra money people
are willing to pay. The higher the household income, the bigger is the probability to support
an increase of more than 500 CHF. Homeowners also have a higher probability of supporting an
increase of more than 500 Francs. The reasons for this might be twofold: on the one hand - as
mentioned in the U.S. literature - the capitalization of education expenditures into house prices
might inuence homeowners. On the other hand, owning a house could just capture some wealth
eects independent of income, homeowners might be better o and thus more willing to invest in
education.
12People from the French and Italian speaking regions are less likely to support a tax increase
of more than 100 CHF as well as individuals who would vote for a general reduction in taxes.
Also consistent with the results in the previous question, people with rather leftist convictions are
more willing to support an increase higher than 101 Francs. All in all, the results in the analyses
of the answer patterns to both questions are rather similar with the exception that when directly
asked about the willingness to spend more of the personal income on education, a genuine age
eect is observable.
||- Table 3 about here ||
5.3 Which sector of public activity should be prioritized in the future?
Until now the questions referred to the support given to an increase of education expenditures
and whether or not respondents were willing to individually pay more taxes for education. In
reality, however, voters do rarely express themselves directly against education expenditures but
rather show preferences for expenditures in other public domains. In the context of limited scal
resources dierences in the preferences for public goods lead to an increased competition for the
scarce public resources. If there is indeed an intergenerational conict between old and young, the
generations would compete for these scarce resources, putting pressure on educational budgets
as a result of this conict. In sections 2 and 3 we hypothesized that the elderly might prefer to
allocate more funds to areas from which they expect to obtain a greater benet, like health and
social security. If this were true, they would push expenditures in these sectors at the expense of
education.
In order to analyze this hypothesis, respondents were asked which public sectors should be
prioritized in the coming years. The possible answers were: education (0), health (1), justice and
police (2), public transport (3) and social security (4). The model is as follows:
P(yi = jjage25 30i;age50i;xi) =




exp(age25 30i  1r + age50i  2r + x0
ir)
j = 0;:::;4
Where age25 30 and age50 are variables indicating the respective age groups, the latter including
13all respondents older than 50 years. People in the reference group therefore have an age between
31 and 49 years. As before 10 = 0, 20 = 0 and 0 = 0 for the base category (0).
The results presented in Table 4 (Specication 1) show that individuals older than 50 years
old would in fact prioritize health or social security rather than education. These results still
hold after controlling for all other variables. Specically, people older than 50 are on average
ve percentage points more likely than people between 30 and 49 to prefer social security and
four percentage points more likely to choose health as the rst priority. As a mirror image they
have a nine percentage points lower probability of choosing education as the highest priority. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coecients of age25 30 and age50 are the same for all
outcome categories. This means we have no evidence that the eldest and the youngest group have
dierent interests. However, one should keep in mind that the younger age group is rather small
and therefore the coecient for age25 30 is very imprecise.
As it could be expected from the previous results, people with a primary or a lower secondary
education are more likely to prioritize all four sectors over education, in comparison to people with
a tertiary degree. Residents of the Italian and French speaking regions have a higher probability
of preferring health over education spending. Political orientation also has an impact on the
probability of preferring a certain sector, respondents with conservative views rated justice and
police higher than education. However, they consider education as more important than social
security. The opposite is true for respondents with political preferences for the left.
||- Table 4 about here ||
6 Conclusions
The demographic changes in most industrialized countries do not only lead to a smaller number of
pupils but also to a much larger share of the population that is in the retirement age. Empirical
studies in a small number of countries over the last decade have suggested that the ageing of
societies might threaten public expenditures on education because the elderly are less inclined
to spend money on education. The dierent preferences of the elderly have been explained by a
14rational behavior of each age group seeking to push public expenditures in domains where they
expect the highest personal benet. The exceptions found in the empirical literature, i.e. the cases
where the elderly do not dier in their preferences for educational expenditures from other age
groups, are compatible with this assumption because they are found in a context where the elderly
also prot from educational spending. Either trough positive capitalization eects; in this case
the elderly homeowners prot from the fact that a higher school quality translates into higher
house-prices. Or through intergenerational solidarity that depends on the one hand on stable
neighborhoods (high bonding) and on the other hand on high levels of political decentralization
and scal autonomy.
Although the empirical literature seen as a whole does provide a rather coherent picture, it
does not provide a direct proof for age-related dierences in the preferences for education. In
order to ll this gap, following an idea of Brunner and Balsdon (2004), we decided to analyze this
question with a more direct approach, simulating political initiatives on education expenditures,
which can be regarded as realistic in the Swiss political context. With a representative sample of
2025 Swiss citizens we analyzed the response patterns of dierent age groups to three questions
using a rich set of background variables as controls.
First, we studied whether older citizens might be willing to back an initiative to increase
education expenditures by 10%. We did not nd evidence that the elderly are less likely to
support the initiative than younger people after we control for political orientation and the general
willingness to pay taxes for public goods. The fact that the elderly are more conservative in
political terms and more likely to support scal austerity programs seem to be the reasons for not
supporting higher spending on education.
Secondly, we analyzed how many extra taxes voters might be willing to pay in order to improve
education quality. This question diers from question one insofar as in the rst case it was not
clear who would have to pay for the extra expenditures on education. The second question aimed
therefore directly at the individual willingness to pay for education. In this case we nd evidence
that the elderly are more likely to refuse any increase in taxes to nance the education system.
But we also nd a very small fraction of elderly people who are more likely to support high taxes
15even when controlling for income, educational background and other socio-demographic variables.
The results indicate that preferences of the elderly are not homogenous, even if the majority is
against paying higher taxes for education.
Thirdly, with respect to the sectors the elderly would choose to prioritize, results conrm our
hypothesis (and the ndings of Borge and Rattso 2007) that older people prefer to support those
areas from which they expect a higher direct benet, namely health and social security.
Overall, the results corroborate the macro-ndings of Grob and Wolter (2007) who had found
in their panel estimates for Swiss Cantons that higher shares of the elderly population led to lower
levels of educational expenditures by showing that the elderly indeed had a lower willingness to
spend money on education.
In regard of the high inuence of the political orientation and the general willingness to pay
for public goods on the willingness to pay for education, it is not entirely clear whether the
correlation between age, conservatism and low willingness to pay for public good is a cohort or
an age eect. If it is the latter, then the demographic ageing process is indeed likely to exert a
signicant negative inuence on educational budgets in the coming years.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 >70 Total
10% increase in education expenditures
Percentage of yes 0.704 0.76 0.749 0.676 0.672 0.685 0.71
(0.038) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.011)
1837
Willingness to pay more taxes per year. How much?
0 0.272 0.29 0.256 0.34 0.344 0.367 0.342
(0.036) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.008)
1-100 0.494 0.459 0.371 0.334 0.332 0.316 0.408
(0.04) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.011)
101-500 0.12 0.161 0.228 0.203 0.149 0.145 0.19
(0.027) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.009)
>500 0.019 0.03 0.057 0.069 0.077 0.054 0.06
(0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006)
1854
Sector which should have priority in the future
Health 0.279 0.29 0.246 0.305 0.269 0.328 0.284
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Justice and Police 0.08 0.062 0.043 0.069 0.075 0.045 0.06
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Education 0.424 0.484 0.538 0.43 0.428 0.392 0.455
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.012)
Public transport 0.03 0.051 0.062 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.052
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Social security 0.19 0.112 0.11 0.143 0.176 0.184 0.148
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.008)
2025
Children attending school
Percentage of yes 0.044 0.44 0.694 0.436 0.161 0.09 0.346
(0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011)
2025
...to be continued on next page
2025-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 >70 Total
Education
Primary 0.437 0.213 0.139 0.236 0.281 0.283 0.244
(0.04) (0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.01)
Secondary 0.399 0.525 0.548 0.528 0.471 0.515 0.508
(0.039) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.01)
Tertiary 0.165 0.262 0.313 0.236 0.248 0.202 0.248
(0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.01)
2025
Political orientation
Right 0.195 0.165 0.154 0.184 0.188 0.201 0.179
(0.037) (0.022) (0.02) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.009)
Centre 0.576 0.598 0.582 0.581 0.63 0.65 0.606
(0.046) (0.029) (0.027) (0.03) (0.027) (0.03) (0.012)
Left 0.229 0.237 0.264 0.235 0.182 0.147 0.215
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.01)
1647
Support for a general reduction in taxes
Percentage of Yes 0.355 0.228 0.253 0.3 0.303 0.334 28.75
(0.041) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.029) (0.453)
1774
21Table 2: Probit results of the probability of accepting an increase in education expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.002)* (0.002)+ (0.002)* (0.002)+ (0.003) (0.003)
Children, yes/no 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Children in school 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.12
(0.08)* (0.08)+ (0.09)+ (0.09)+ (0.09)
Education: primary -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.21
(0.09)** (0.10)** (0.10)* (0.10)*
Education: secondary -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Income: <3000 SF 0.31 0.35 0.27 0.11
(0.13)* (0.13)** (0.14)* (0.15)
Income: 3000-5000 SF 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.09
(0.10)* (0.10)* (0.10) (0.11)
Income: 5000-7000 SF 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.03
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.1)
Income: 7000-9000 SF 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13
(0.10)+ (0.1) (0.11) (0.11)
Countryside -0.31 -0.33 -0.32 -0.25
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.09)**
Small town -0.26 -0.28 -0.28 -0.23
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)**
Latin Switzerland 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Agree to a general tax reduction -0.27 -0.20 -0.19
(0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)**
Political orientation: Right -0.40 -0.37
(0.09)** (0.09)**




Constant 0.8 0.66 0.87 0.95 0.93 0.71
(0.11)** (0.12)** (0.15)** (0.15)** (0.16)** (0.21)**
N 1837 1833 1833 1673 1673 1659
Log Likelihood -1103.60 -1097.17 -1080.57 -972.42 -955.02 -937.76
Standard errors in parentheses
**Signiﬁcant at the 1%, *signiﬁcant at the 5%, + signiﬁcant at the 10%
22Table 3: Multinomial logit model of the willingness to pay more
taxes to improve the quality of education. How much?
Base Category: 0 CHF 1-100 SF 101-500 SF >500 SF
(1)
Age -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.00)** (0.00)* (0.01)





Age -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.00)** (0.00)* (0.01)
Children -0.09 0.21 -0.15
(0.15) (0.19) (0.29)
Children in school -0.06 -0.01 0.25
(0.14) (0.17) (0.26)




...to be continued on next page
23Base Category: 0 CHF 1-100 SF 101-500 SF >500 SF
(3)
Age -0.01 -0.005 0.02
(0.00)** (0.01) (0.01)*
Children -0.14 0.12 -0.18
(0.16) (0.20) (0.31)
Children in school -0.02 -0.09 0.21
(0.14) (0.18) (0.28)
Male -0.03 0.02 0.25
(0.11) (0.14) (0.22)
Education: primary -0.02 -1.28 -1.26
(0.17) (0.22)** (0.38)**
Education: secondary -0.12 -0.7 -0.52
(0.15) (0.16)** (0.24)*
Income: <3000 -0.25 -1.07 -1.65
(0.22) (0.31)** (0.49)**
Income: 3000-5000 -0.002 -0.99 -1.7
(0.18) (0.23)** (0.36)**
Income: 5000-7000 0.2 -0.22 -0.91
(0.18) (0.20) (0.29)**
Income: 7000-9000 0.19 0.15 -0.52
(0.19) (0.21) (0.30)+
Countryside -0.09 0.20 -0.37
(0.14) (0.17) (0.27)
Small town 0.01 0.24 -0.25
(0.13) (0.17) (0.25)
Latin Switzerland -0.14 -0.51 -0.66
(0.12) (0.16)** (0.26)*




...to be continued on next page
24Base Category: 0 CHF 1-100 SF 101-500 SF >500 SF
(4)
Age -0.01 -0.001 0.02
(0.00)** (0.01) (0.01)*
Children -0.1 0.09 -0.18
(0.18) (0.22) (0.32)
Children in school -0.12 -0.20 0.13
(0.16) (0.19) (0.29)
Male -0.04 0.05 0.30
(0.13) (0.16) (0.24)
Education: primary -0.31 0.24 0.39
(0.15)* (0.22) (0.37)
Education: secondary -0.26 0.88 0.84
(0.19) (0.24)** (0.40)*
Income: <3000 -0.42 -1.09 -1.36
(0.25)+ (0.34)** (0.52)**
Income: 3000-5000 -0.08 -0.91 -1.50
(0.20) (0.25)** (0.39)**
Income: 5000-7000 0.11 -0.24 -0.95
(0.19) (0.22) (0.31)**
Income: 7000-9000 0.16 0.12 -0.68
(0.20) (0.22) (0.32)*
Countryside -0.01 0.19 -0.49
(0.15) (0.19) (0.29)+
Small town 0.05 0.26 -0.33
(0.15) (0.19) (0.27)
Latin Switzerland -0.10 -0.51 -0.69
(0.13) (0.17)** (0.28)*
Homeowner 0.02 0.17 0.64
(0.13) (0.17) (0.27)*
For general reduction in taxes -0.6 -1.13 -0.53
(0.13)** (0.18)** (0.26)*
Political orientation: Right -0.25 -0.29 -0.31
(0.17) (0.22) (0.33)
Political orientation: Left 0.19 0.58 0.89
(0.17) (0.20)** (0.28)**




Standard errors in parentheses
**Signiﬁcant at the 1%, *signiﬁcant at the 5%, + signiﬁcant at the 10%
25Table 4: Multinomial logit model of which public expenditures should have priority
in the future
Base Category: Education Health Justice/Police Public Transport Social Security
(1)
Age: 25-30 0.23 0.56 -0.41 0.73
(0.21) (-0.35) (0.49) (0.25)**
Age: >50 0.32 0.40 0.12 0.62
(0.11)** (0.21)+ (0.21) (0.15)**
Constant -0.65 -2.28 -2.19 -1.53




Age: 25-30 0.15 0.32 -0.55 0.57
(0.23) (0.39) (0.51) (0.27)*
Age: >50 0.34 0.45 0.15 0.62
(0.13)** (0.23)+ (0.24) (0.16)**
Children -0.18 -0.33 -0.29 -0.21
(0.15) (0.26) (0.28) (0.18)
Children in school 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.09
(0.14) (0.26) (0.27) (0.18)
Constant -0.54 -2.08 -2.00 -1.33




Age: 25-30 -0.001 0.04 -0.82 0.48
(0.26) (0.43) (0.58) (0.3)
Age: >50 0.33 0.34 -0.01 0.59
(0.15)* (0.26) (0.25) (0.19)**
Children -0.22 -0.02 -0.23 -0.08
(0.18) (0.31) (0.31) (0.22)
Children in school 0.03 0.22 0.13 -0.18
(0.16) (0.28) (0.28) (0.20)
...to be continued on next page
26Base Category: Education Health Justice/Police Public Transport Social Security
Male -0.41 0.28 0.46 -0.17
(0.13)** (0.23) (0.23)+ (0.16)
Education: primary 0.72 0.49 0.63 0.57
(0.19)** (0.31) (0.34)+ (0.25)*
Education: secondary 0.62 0.27 0.57 0.81
(0.15)** (0.26) (0.28)* (0.20)**
Homeowner -0.35 -0.27 -0.09 -0.46
(0.13)** (0.23) (0.24) (0.17)**
Married 0.05 -0.48 0.35 0.12
(0.15) (0.24)+ (0.27) (0.18)
Income: <3000 0.34 0.40 0.63 0.04
(0.27) (0.43) (0.44) (0.32)
Income: 3000-5000 0.39 -0.03 0.16 0.16
(0.21)+ (0.35) (0.35) (0.24)
Income: 5000-7000 0.32 0.07 0.09 -0.20
(0.19)+ (0.32) (0.32) (0.23)
Income: 7000-9000 0.3 0.03 -0.47 -0.25
(0.2) (0.33) (0.37) (0.24)
Countryside -0.07 -0.29 -0.1 -0.03
(0.15) (0.27) (0.28) (0.19)
Small town 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.33
(0.15) (0.25) (0.27) (0.18)+
Latin Switzerland 0.77 0.24 -0.03 0.13
(0.13)** (0.23) (0.25) (0.17)
For general reduction in taxes 0.64 0.40 0.8 0.48
(0.14)** (0.23)+ (0.23)** (0.17)**
Political orientation: Right -0.16 0.53 0.24 -0.74
(0.18) (0.25)* (0.30) (0.27)**
Political orientation: Left -0.27 -0.54 0.64 0.38
(0.17) (0.35) (0.27)* (0.19)*
Constant -2.04 -3 -3.49 -2.86
(0.33)** (0.55)** (0.58)** (0.41)**
N=1755
LL=-2188.1831
Standard errors in parentheses
**Signiﬁcant at the 1%, *signiﬁcant at the 5%, + signiﬁcant at the 10%
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